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Death	  in	  Our	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Abstract: This is the text of the Annual Lecture of the Society for Applied 
Philosophy, delivered in Oxford on 22 May 2012. I kept the talk style of 
the paper. It examines a central aspect of the relations between duration 
and quality of life by considering the moral right to voluntary euthanasia, 
and some aspects of the moral case for a legal right to euthanasia. Would 
widespread acceptance of a right to voluntary euthanasia lead to 
widespread changes in attitudes to life and death? Many of its advocates 
deny that, seeing it as a narrow right enabling people to avoid ending 
their life in great pain or total dependence, or a vegetative state. I argue 
that the right cannot cogently be conceived as a narrow right, confined to 
very limited circumstances. It is based on the value of having the 
normative power to choose the time and manner of one’s death. Its 
recognition will be accompanied by far reaching changes in culture 
and attitudes, and these changes will enrich people’s life by enabling them 
	  





1.	   Introductory	  background	  	  
	  
We care about the quality of our life, and we care about its 
duration. We care about the quality and duration of the life of others. 
These are generalisations of how things are and how they ought to be. 
They are not without exceptions. Sometimes we do not care, and




sometimes (not necessarily the same) we have no reason to care. My 
topic is the relation between the two: between concern for the quality 
of life and concern for its duration, or more specifically the relations 
between the reasons for the two concerns. 
That they are interdependent in various ways is obvious, and we 
are or can be aware of the connection any time we choose an activity 
that involves some risk to our life, a risk greater than that of some 
available alternatives, because it is worth it. 
It may be tempting to think that we live in order to live well and 
that therefore duration is entirely subordinate to quality of life. But that 
view is unsustainable. First, there is a stark asymmetry between the 
reasons that bear on the life of others and those that bear on the agent’s 
own life. There are severe limits to one’s freedom to shorten (without 
consent) the life of another even for the sake of the quality of life of that 
other. But even regarding one’s own life it would appear reasonable to 
forgo benefits in order to extend the duration of one’s life. There is a 
good deal of writing aiming to establish the right balance between quality 
and duration, perhaps in ways that secure a greater benefit to the person 
concerned over all. For reasons that may be apparent from 
other work of mine, but that will remain unexplored today, I tend to 
doubt most of the conclusions so reached. While caring for longevity 
with no quality may be irrational, as are attitudes that ignore the 
inherent implications of one’s choices and commitments, for the most 
part it seems plausible to hold that there is no right balance. Much 
seems to be a matter of non-reason-based attitudes, which need not be 
long enduring ones. For good or ill, this will be the background for my 
observations today. 




The relations, and potential conflict, between duration and quality 
of our life is most dramatically before us when considering, practically or 
theoretically, voluntary euthanasia. My talk today is not about the 
legalisation of voluntary euthanasia (and I will consider that to include 
mercy killing at the request of the dying as well as assisted suicide, and 
many of the considerations I mention apply to suicide as well). 
Legalisation involves many practical difficulties that I will not discuss. I 
will consider some aspects of the morality of voluntary euthanasia to 
	  
illustrate the tangle of connections between concern for the duration 
and concern for the quality of life. And naturally, what I will say has a 
bearing on the way we think of voluntary euthanasia as an independent 
issue. I will suggest that our attitude to voluntary euthanasia has wide 
implications, that it affects fundamental aspects of the kind of societies 
we live in, and therefore also the opportunities and limits we encounter 
in them. 
	  
2.	  	  A	  note	  on	  the	  limitations	  of	  a	  right	  of	  conscientious	  objection	  
	  
Perhaps I could start with a small point, illustrating the direction 
of travel rather than the main question that I want to examine. In 
considering voluntary euthanasia I will consider both the case for a 
moral right and the (moral) case for a legal right to voluntary euthanasia. 
Their scope need not be identical, as a variety of considerations, both 
principled and practical, may suggest that the legal right could be wider 
in some respects and narrower in others. Most obviously its 
	  
administration may require conforming to certain preconditions that are 
not part of the moral right itself. Furthermore, the legalisation of 
voluntary euthanasia may mean no more than that engaging in or 
assisting with it would be lawful activities incurring no legal disapproval 
	  
of any kind. It may also mean that under certain conditions publicly 
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provided administrative and medical services would be required to assist 
in its administration. Given my aim in this talk, except for my next 
comment, I will not consider the case for this positive assistance by 
public bodies or at public expense. 
Assume that we are resolved to legalise some form of regulated 
voluntary euthanasia (and whenever I refer to euthanasia I will be 
referring to voluntary euthanasia only). The law would entitle people 
who met certain conditions to assistance in committing suicide. They 
might even have a right to be killed on request – always subject to 
certain procedural and substantive conditions. Now, assume that this 
would impose institutional requirements on some medical and other 
bodies to provide such a service. Needless to say, some people will have 
deep reservations about taking any part in the preparation for or the 
performance of euthanasia, and I am going to assume that such people 
will be able to avail themselves of a conscientious objection exception to 
	  
any duty to participate. 
	  
But those who object to euthanasia will not find such an exception 
satisfactory. I mean that they would not find it adequate to the task that 
conscientious exceptions are meant to serve, namely enabling people 
not to suffer serious disadvantage by living according to their moral 
convictions. For one thing, those who will claim conscientious objection 
will find their employment opportunities restricted. Given the public 
duty to provide the institutional facilities required by law for people to 
be able to avail themselves of their (legal) right to a regulated euthanasia, 
those who have conscientious reservations may be disadvantaged in 
various ways. For example, they will not be able to obtain or keep jobs if 
doing so will make it difficult for people to avail themselves of the right 
to euthanasia. Furthermore, the objectors will point out that they object 
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not merely to active participation in administering the right, but also to 
living in a society where euthanasia is legal, with all the implications that 
will have for public attitudes to death and dying. 
Such objections are familiar from other areas of legal reforms such 
as abortion, gay adoptions and gay marriages. In as much as the 
objections are based on a claimed personal right of the conscientious 
exception kind, both objections fail. No one has an unconditional right 
to be a medical practitioner. One has a right to a fair opportunity to 
become a medical practitioner provided one is able and willing to 
perform the duties that go with jobs for which medical skills are needed. 
	  
The conscientious exemption from a duty to participate in 
administering the right is allowed because, and so long as, it does not 
threaten the provision of the service. Therefore, if many otherwise 
qualified medical practitioners claim the exemption, they will not be able 
to get medical jobs. Those will go to people willing to provide the 
service. The same considerations apply to administrative and other staff 
involved in the administration of a right to voluntary euthanasia. 
I will shortly examine the character of the public culture likely in a 
society that recognises a right to voluntary euthanasia. At the moment 
we are considering the claim by some people that they are entitled not 
to live in such a society because they find its public culture deeply 
objectionable. They object to the society because of its moral character. 
But the right they claim is that those who do not share their 
condemnation of the society should nevertheless avoid encouraging it in 
order to spare them the necessity of living in such a society. This is a 
self-protecting attitude, not to be confused with the demand that others 
	  
should conform to the principles one holds dear for their own sake, or 
for the sake of truth, god, or anything like that. Yet it cannot be 
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respected except by forcing others into living under a public culture that 
they in turn will find deeply objectionable. And one’s objection to a 
condition cannot warrant subjecting others to the same condition. A 
degree of local separation of neighbourhoods can provide some 
accommodation, but in principle the objection cannot be accommodated. 
It is a conflict of reasons in which the conscientious objectors lose. 
So if one is justified in legalising euthanasia then widespread 
consequences for professional and occupational opportunities and for 
the public culture can be expected to follow, and cannot be objected to. 
But while such claims to personal exemption must be rejected in 
principle, they have considerable practical force, and they have to be 
taken seriously in deliberating about whether the legalisation of 
euthanasia should be undertaken at the present time, and how it should 
be regulated: these decisions should depend in part on the degree of 
aggravation the legalisation of euthanasia will cause to sections of the 
population, and on the size of those sections. 
	  
3.	  	  The	  narrow	  rationale	  view	  
	  
There is, of course, another, more direct, way in which the 
objection to the public culture that will prevail once euthanasia is 
legalised may constitute an objection to legalisation. It need not be 
advanced as a claim based on a personal difficulty in living in a society 
with a certain public culture. It may be an objection to that public 
culture based on its reprehensible character. For example, it is often said 
that if voluntary euthanasia were legalised the elderly would be under 
pressure to opt for it to spare their friends and relatives the need to 
care for them, or in order to let the beneficiaries of their wills inherit 
	  
sooner rather than later, or more rather than less. 
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Let it be assumed that some such consequences would follow the 
legalisation of euthanasia and that they are undesirable. We will return 
to this question later. The issue we must face now is whether they do 
constitute a sound objection (a) to legalisation, or even more radically 
(b) to the case for a (moral) right to voluntary euthanasia. 
I will assume that the case for the legalisation of euthanasia is 
based not on an alleged public good that it will secure (reducing the cost 
to the public of providing medical services?), but on a claim of an 
individual right to have the option of voluntary euthanasia at least under 
some conditions. It would seem to follow that if the adverse 
consequences attributed to legalisation are a result of an abuse of the 
legal right that legalisation will establish, they constitute a case against 
the legal recognition of the moral right to euthanasia, but they do not 
	  
count against the existence of that right. 
	  
Some would indeed argue that these adverse consequences 
cannot be more than the result of abusing the law, and that the proper 
reaction to the abuse is to protect people from it, to couple the 
legalisation of euthanasia with protections against its abuse. Any reform 
brings with it new opportunities for abuse. They should not be allowed 
to stop reform where reform is otherwise justified, it will be claimed. 
Though one should do one’s best to fight the abuses. 
So long as one allows that the prospect of abuse may affect the 
timing and manner of reform this seems an appropriate response to the 
risk of abuse. But are the pressures that legalised voluntary euthanasia 
will impose on the elderly nothing but a result of abuse of the law, and 
of the moral principles underlying it? Here is an argument suggesting that 
	  
this pressure will not be entirely due to possible abuse, that in part these 
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anticipated pressures are legitimate consequences of legalised voluntary 
euthanasia: 
A legal right to voluntary euthanasia provides people with an 
option they do not currently have, the option of deciding on the time 
and conditions of their own death even when they can no longer 
commit suicide unaided. We would not only expect, we should 
encourage people to use that option for good reasons. People who 
become aware that they are losing the affection and good will of their 
friends and relations may well consider that they will be better off 
availing themselves of the new option so as to retain their reputation 
with members of their families after they die. People’s self-interest, 
those who would reason in that way assume, does not end with the end 
of their life. People have an interest in their posthumous reputation. It is 
therefore not an abuse to provide them with reasons to use the option 
to die in a way that will serve their posthumous reputation. 
This is a somewhat crass argument. But why? Perhaps because it 
rests on a misunderstanding of the rationale of the right to voluntary 
euthanasia. Perhaps its rationale is to protect people, not all people, but 
many, from being condemned to live a life not worth living. There are 
various ways in which one may conceive of the relations between the 
right to euthanasia and escaping a life not worth living. To keep matters 
simple I will describe two: the pure and the mixed variations of the life- 
not-worth-living thesis as I shall call them. Both deny that the right 
aims to provide people with an option that can be rationally chosen for 
any reason for preferring death to continuing alive. 
According to the pure view, the rationale for the right is to spare 
people from having to carry on living once their life is not worth living 
anymore. But the right aims to spare people this fate in a way that 
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protects them from mistaken application of that rationale, and from 
being taken advantage of by unscrupulous misuse of it. That is why each 
one of us is given the sole power to decide when to ask for euthanasia. 
Acting rationally one would choose not to carry on living once life is no 
longer worth living, and only then. And the fact that each one of us has 
the sole power to decide when that point is reached minimises mistaken 
applications of the right, and protects people from abuse, the abuse of a 
power to decide when life has become not worth living that would have 
occurred had that power been entrusted to some public authority or to 
relatives, etc. 
The mixed view differs in allowing that people may have cogent 
reasons against opting for euthanasia even if their lives are not worth 
living. They may, for example, be attached to people for whom their 
death would be a great loss. Or, they may believe that they have reasons 
against euthanasia, which while not cogent they may rationally believe to 
be valid. They may, e.g., have religious beliefs that, while false, are not 
irrational for them to hold. Like the pure view, the mixed one sees the 
point of the right to euthanasia in offering the option of escaping a life 
not worth living, but unlike it, it does not assume that it is always best to 
	  
take advantage of the option. 
	  
Both views see the rationale of the right to euthanasia in providing 
an escape from a life not worth living, and both see the case for providing 
this escape route in the fact that such a life is bad for those whose life it 
is. Therefore, both views deny that one has such a right whenever one’s 
reasons for ending one’s life are better than the reasons for not ending it, 
let alone that one has a right to euthanasia, or even to suicide, which 




4.	  	  Euthanasia	  and	  a	  life-­‐-­‐-­‐not-­‐-­‐-­‐worth-­‐-­‐-­‐living	  
	  
The problem is that both versions of the ‘life-not-worth-living’ 
thesis are flawed. First, both focus on the outcome – the avoidance of a 
life not worth living, regarding the right to euthanasia as justified by the 
fact that it is a good way of securing the outcome. In doing so neither 
finds intrinsic value in the right itself, or in the choice that it secures. 
Second, both assume that one should use the right to euthanasia only if 
one’s life is of a kind that can be correctly described ‘a life not worth 
living’. 
I will address the second criticism first. As you will have gathered from my 
opening remarks I readily acknowledge that some lives are better, enjoy 
greater levels of well-being, than others – just think of lives of pain, or of 
repression and the frustrations and suffering it induces, or of self- hatred, 
self-loathing, etc. and compare them with lives that are relatively free 
from these manifestations. Yet for the most part there is no truth 
of the matter as to which life is better. 
	  
Even if this bold assertion, which cannot be justified or explored here, is 
true, it is possible that while only relatively few comparative judgements 
are true, important non-comparative ones are, and can be known to be, 
true. In particular, possibly there are kinds of life that are not worth 
living. I would not wish to deny that. The question is, or one question is, 
is the narrow rationale view of the right to voluntary euthanasia based 
on that fact? I think that it is not, for the standard arguments for a 
narrow understanding of the case for euthanasia apply beyond cases of a 
life not worth living. 
Typically at least four conditions are often thought to justify voluntary 
euthanasia: (a) a life without consciousness, known as a vegetative life, 
(b) a life of unremitting great pain, (c) a life of total dependence on others, 
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(d) a life of greatly diminished mental capacities (severe loss of memory, 
absence of linguistic capacity, unremitting severe mental distress, fear 
etc.). The vegetative life is not worth living. That is an easy case, for it is 
barely an animate life at all. It is a vegetative life, and the reasons to 
preserve inanimate life based on its intrinsic value are not very strong. 
Regarding the last three, matters are much less clear. 
Some people do prefer, or think that they will prefer, even a life of pain, 
or of dependence, to death, and I do not know what mistake they are 
making. But if they are not making any mistake then perhaps their choice 
is self-vindicatory – their life is (for them) worth living. Yet this may not 
be the right conclusion to draw because other people do choose death 
over a life of unremitting pain or over a life of dependency. I do not 
know what mistake they are making either. Assume that neither makes 
	  
any mistake. It cannot be that their life is both worth living and not 
worth living. Could it be that it is worth living for those who choose to 
live and not worth living for those who choose to die? 
Of course, those who choose to die may well say that they do so 
	  
because they find their life not worth living. But possibly this is merely an 
expression of their preference rather than a specification of a reason for 
it. Or, it may be no more than an expression of the kind of preference 
they have: they prefer death to this life not in order to benefit others 
but because of the quality of the life that they can expect. If so then their 
use of the term does not vindicate the idea that there is a kind of life 
that is not worth living. 
	  
That idea assumes that life may have a quality that, for any human being, 
renders it not-worth-living. (And I assume that being “not worth living” 
is inconsistent with being “worth living”). Preferences to live or to die 
can therefore be justified or criticised by whether they reject or fail to 
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reject a life that is not worth living. But if that is the notion of a life 
worth living we have in mind then it fails to apply to a life of total 
dependency or of unremitting pain. Such a life is not ‘not-worth-living’ 
and yet it may well justify voluntary euthanasia, or so its advocates claim. 
In reaching this conclusion I have relied on the assumption that some 
may prefer to die rather than have a life of, say total dependence, while 
others may prefer to remain alive, without either making any mistake. 
But is the assumption justified? Of course, some such preferences may 
be irrational or be based on false assumptions, e.g. that one is subject to 
a divine command to choose one way or the other. But they need not 
be. People in the conditions imagined may have some reasons to remain 
alive: they could, if they try, savour the good of being in the world, 
experience and observe some of it. And they may be able to retain or 
even develop valuable relations with others. Some would not find that 
these reasons outweigh the reasons – of pain, sense of humiliation and 
others – for ending their lives. But this is another context in which I 
believe that the conflicting reasons are incommensurate, and either 
decision is – or can be (depending on the details of the circumstances, 
and the way it is taken) reasonable or justified. 
An interim conclusion: I am considering the case of a narrow rationale 
for a right to voluntary euthanasia. There could be a limited right to 
voluntary euthanasia that applies only to vegetative life on the ground 
that that is not a life worth living. But the typical claim for recognition of 
a right to voluntary euthanasia that applies to lives of unremitting pain, 
or total dependence, or greatly reduced capacities cannot rely on the 
	  
notion of a life not worth living, for it is false that such lives are not 
worth living. 
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5.	  	  Right	  to	  euthanasia	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  
	  
If there is a right to voluntary euthanasia with the scope its 
advocates commonly espouse it must rest on a different rationale. 
Moreover, in casting doubt on the possibility that the right can be based 
on a case for providing people with the option to escape from a life not 
worth living we also, indirectly, raise doubt about the possibility of its 
being based on the case for an option of ending one’s life because of its 
poor intrinsic quality, understood as a low level of well-being. In 
examining the case for that possibility, namely for a right based on the 
poor level of well-being one would enjoy (but that falls short of 
constituting a life not worth living) a natural way to proceed is to relate 
it to a low level of well-being that makes preferring death reasonable. It 
may be the case that the reasons for carrying on living that the quality of 
	  
life one would enjoy provides do not defeat the reasons one has for 
ending one’s life because of its poor quality. So the low well-being does 
not constitute a decisive or conclusive reason for ending one's life, but it 
makes that option reasonable. 
The difficulties with this approach are considerable. 
	  
First, it would open the door wide to requests for euthanasia well 
beyond the standard cases. People who dishonoured themselves do 
sometimes commit suicide to escape a life of shame, or of self-hatred, 
and so on and so forth. I am sure that some advocates of voluntary 
euthanasia would deny that a desire to escape a life of shame and 
dishonour makes a decision to end one’s life reasonable. But I do not 
believe that there is a cogent case for such a conclusion. Again, there is 
not much that I can say, given the limited time, other than that I do not 
believe that there are compelling objections to the view that people may 
reasonably feel or believe that there is no point to carrying on. The 
14 	  
explanatory reasons for such feelings/beliefs may or may not include 
normative reasons. But either way they may be beyond criticism. (Which 
does not of course mean that there is anything amiss with trying to 
change the mind of those who actually feel that way.) It is true that in 
various cultures some views or other about what makes such choices 
reasonable are common. However, without a good case for supporting 
them it would be wrong to base a moral conclusion merely on the 
prevalence of such views. 
A similar charge of arbitrariness would be my reply to those who 
may develop a case for the right to euthanasia not from an assessment 
of quality of life or level of well-being generally but on specific conditions 
	  
needed to justify the right. It may be argued, e.g., that severe pain makes 
a choice of ending one’s life reasonable even for people whose overall 
quality of life is quite high. Again, many will, in those circumstances, 
prefer to stay alive, but those who prefer dying need not be 
unreasonable in their choice. The charge of arbitrariness is raised not 
against recognising the significance of pain, but against underplaying the 
significance of damaged self-respect, of feelings of guilt for having 
betrayed what is most dear to one, feelings of hopelessness about ever 
forming deep relations with others, and other conditions that lead 
people to prefer dying. All of these, and many others, when well- 
founded, render a choice for dying reasonable because of the quality of 
the life one will have. 
A second objection to the poor quality of life condition is the 
arbitrariness of excluding other kinds of reasons from the scope of the 
right. In cultures known to me suicide is approved of most, sometimes 
celebrated, if committed for the sake of others, or in pursuit of a noble 
cause. Of the many examples let me just mention the real and fictional 
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people who committed suicide when, during WWII, they fell into the 
hands of the Gestapo, and did so to avoid betraying colleagues under 
torture. Cases of this kind are not mentioned in discussions of 
euthanasia presumably because those discussions are limited to 
occasions in which people are physically unable to commit suicide 
unaided. But while it may well be that assistance at public expense 
should be limited to people unable to end their life on their own there is 
no reason to think that the moral right to be assisted is limited in that 
way. 
	  
6.	  	  A	  respect-­‐-­‐-­‐based	  right	  
	  
I am exploring the possibility that a right to euthanasia is limited to 
a special class of cases, for example to the four categories I mentioned 
earlier, and that the rationale for the right and for its limited scope is 
based on the reasonableness of choosing to die for reasons to do with 
the quality of one’s expected life. My conclusion is that quality of life 
considerations, first, will not limit the right in the ways that its advocates 
sometimes assume, and second, they cannot be the only considerations 
on which the right is based. 
This last observation brings me back to the second objection to 
the life-not-worth-living thesis that was so far left unexamined. I 
remarked that the thesis misses out on the significance of having a right 
to euthanasia, and regards it as merely a way of minimising abuses, 
minimising the number of cases in which euthanasia occurred, or 
pressure for it to take place was exercised, when it should not have 
been. Following a familiar line of thought, I would like now to suggest 
that we are concerned with a right to euthanasia because the ability to 
choose how and when one’s life will end is valuable in itself. Its value 
provides an alternative basis for the right to euthanasia. 
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This thought echoes the considerations that also underlie the right 
to life, or the duty not to kill people – for our purposes it does not 
matter whether the duty derives from the right or not. What does 
matter is that the duty is one we have regarding all persons in virtue of 
their being persons. Disregarding disagreements about what it is about 
persons that warrants having a duty not to kill them, I will assume that 
the duty derives from the fact that persons are rational beings, creatures 
possessing the powers of rational agency. When the duty conflicts with 
others the resolution of the conflict, if it has any, depends on additional 
considerations, and possibly the expected quality of people’s lives is 
among them. But it is not the ground of the duty. 
The capacity for rational agency, I will join many in assuming, is the 
basis of a duty to respect those who have it, a respect that extends, 
within certain bounds, to the exercise of that capacity, namely to the 
way people lead their lives. And that includes its exercise to determine 
	  
when and how to end one’s life. Having that option is valuable, and 
therefore it is protected by the right to euthanasia. The right to life 
protects people from the time and manner of their death being 
determined by others, and the right to euthanasia grants each person 
the power to choose themselves that time and manner. 
In shifting attention to the significance of the right to euthanasia I 
do not mean to imply that there are no reasons for euthanasia that are 
not involved with it, not a result of it. We have reasons to end the life of 
animals of any species to save them from the misery of extreme pain at 
the end of their lives, and in some circumstances these would apply to 
human beings as well. But when it comes to rational agents, the duty to 
respect their rational powers, and protect their ability to use them, 
modifies the implications of quality of life considerations: they become 
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matters to be considered by each person regarding their own lives. 
Others have to respect their decisions. Contemporary claims for a right 
to euthanasia are claims to this right-based approach. They recognise 
that there are quality of life reasons for ending life, but take them to be 
matters over which each person has sovereign power to decide his or 
her course. And if nothing else then that sovereignty means that the 
right can be exercised for a variety of reasons, and also for presumed 
reasons that are either no reasons at all, or not adequate to justify 
ending one’s life. 
	  
7.	  	  Death	  in	  our	  life	  
	  
Those who deny a moral right to euthanasia fear that legalisation 
of limited and regulated euthanasia will be the thin end of a substantial 
wedge. As you see, I believe that there is something to that fear. 
Believing as I do in a right to euthanasia you may expect me to favour 
the legalisation of a sweeping, broadly defined right. But that is not so. 
As we know, for a non-technical law – one we expect to be known by 
and relied on by the public at large – to succeed it has to be understood, 
	  
at least in a rough and ready way, and to be consonant with broadly 
accepted attitudes. Possibly this would be true of a narrowly defined 
legalisation of euthanasia, but clearly not regarding broadly conceived 
legalisation. Where I differ from ‘thin end of the wedge’ opponents of 
legalisation is in welcoming shifts of public opinion towards a broader 
right, which they fear. 
I left untouched many questions regarding the scope of the moral 
right. Instead I will conclude with some reflections about the ways in 
which it would be good if attitudes to death changed. 
The clear difference between what I called the narrow and the 
broad right to euthanasia is that the latter takes it to protect not only 
18 	  
the option to escape certain undesirable conditions at the end of one’s 
life, but also and primarily to protect an option to shape the way one’s 
life ends, by deciding on its time and manner. And inevitably shaping 
one’s dying contributes to giving shape, contributes to the form and 
meaning one’s life has. Those who reflect, plan and decide on the 
manner of their dying make their dying part of their life. And if they do 
so well then by integrating their dying into their life they enrich their life. 
	  
But do I not exaggerate? Interestingly, while the debate about 
voluntary euthanasia has a contemporary air, it relates to traditional 
ideals first about good ways of dying and second about a good time to 
die. 
	  
Various religious and other popular views of life relate a human life 
to a task or several tasks and a cycle of preparation, different stages of 
achievement, and then relative retirement from active involvement or 
pursuits. Typically they see death as regrettable or lamentable if it 
happens before the final stage of retirement, but natural and acceptable 
when it happens at that stage. Grief will accompany it whenever it 
happens, grief over the loss of a person who or whose presence was 
significant to those now left without it. But concerning those who die 
after the time for achievement is over the grief will be accompanied by 
knowledge that the deceased had his or her life, and whether it turned 
out well or not, there is nothing that can change it now. The time is ripe 
to die. The ideal form of death is often taken to be dying in the presence 
of close friends and relations, being reconciled to the appropriateness of 
the arriving death. 
Such conceptions of when and how to die are still widespread but 
they are weakened if not undermined by radically different ideas about 
what people may properly strive to accomplish in their lives, and by the 
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radical increase of life expectancy. We are used to thinking that people 
can find different content to their life: a second or third career, 
voluntary involvement with charities, political organisations, or other 
more personal pursuits. So that until one’s health radically fails there is 
no end to the phase of achievement. Alongside that change, a more 
radical change became dominant in many circles, according to which 
continuation of life is more or less unconditionally good, whatever kind 
of life one has. 
I mention these shifts of culture and opinion because recognition 
of a right to euthanasia is likely to boost the old traditional ideas, albeit 
in a contemporary form. This is beautifully illustrated by Eddy Terstall’s 
2004 Dutch film Simon, in which the dying scene is a celebration of 
Simon and his life. There are no moral or normative recipes for the 
correct and valuable use of the power to shape one’s dying. It is not 
inherently limited to the standard cases of euthanasia, or to euthanasia at 
all. With time the practice may spread to suicide, assisted suicide, or 
consensual killing of people who are not dependent on external help, but 
choose to use it. Participation itself may acquire a bonding meaning. 
Meaning is socially dependent and develops with changing circumstances. 
But decisions on time and form of dying must remain marginal to 
our life – mortality may be a major factor influencing the duration, shape 
and content of human enterprises, and imaginative reflection and 
fantasies of dying also play an important role; our own dying, however, 
stands outside any of our personal attachments and pursuits. 
Can it be otherwise? Can it be inherent in any personal ambition 
that it culminates in dying? Of course. But, assuming that such pursuits 
and ambitions are bound to remain of marginal appeal, I will not 
speculate whether any of them may have any merit. 
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The main way in which making death part of our life by giving us 
greater control over its time and manner changes our life is not, 
however, by its impact on specific attachments or pursuits. The main 
impact is likely to be more pervasive and diffuse. Consciousness of death 
and fear of dying - a separate factor, to be sure, but one that in our life is 
hard to separate from knowledge of our mortality - have a way of 
colouring much of our life, and the changing attitude I am envisaging will 
likewise affect our life, real and imaginative, in multifarious and diffuse 
ways. So, while the power to decide the time and manner of one’s death, 
when wisely used, will contribute to the value of various episodes in 
one’s life, the main positive effect I have in mind is of the full, guiltless 
acceptance of the power itself. It can transform one’s perspective on 
one’s life; reduce the aspects of it from which one is alienated, or those 
that inspire a sense of helplessness or terror. It is a change that makes 
one whole in generating a perspective, a way of conceiving oneself and 
one’s life free from some of those negative aspects. 
An important area where control over the time and manner of 
our dying may make a significant difference is in its impact on others. 
This is a cause of concern for many when contemplating legalising 
euthanasia. Would not people be driven to shorten their life in order to 
spare others the burden of caring for them, and so on? Perhaps it is 
possible to classify the main other-regarding concerns into four central 
or standard categories: (1) sparing the effort and distress that looking 
after ailing people causes those who are personally involved in looking 
after them; (2) preventing one’s savings from being used up on medical 
and other forms of care, in order to have more to leave by one’s will; 
(3) saving the public the expense of providing medical, nursing and other 
publicly provided care; (4) preventing the memory people one cares 
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about will have of one being of a person in decline. There are other 
cases, but I will use these four as an illustration of the wider 
phenomenon. 
What should we think about decisions based on these 
considerations? Before we come to that we should distinguish that 
question from the related but distinct question of when is it appropriate 
for people to point out that one may be advised to ask for assistance in 
committing suicide, or in any way put moral or psychological pressure 
on one to opt for euthanasia in order to achieve one or more of these 
goals? Clearly, improper pressure may be applied with a view to taking 
advantage of people’s fragility. But what constitutes improper pressure 
depends in part on whether these considerations are appropriate in the 
first place. 
I see no reason to think that they are not. In contexts other than 
euthanasia it is common to laud people who committed suicide for the 
good of others, or for the public good: the person who threw himself on 
a grenade to absorb the impact of its explosion and save the people 
hiding alongside him, or indeed the other soldiers in the trench, was one 
of the heroic, semi-mythical, figures of my youth, and people setting out 
on suicidal military missions were also admired in many cultures. 
Similarly, it is acknowledged that there is a limit to the amount of public 
resources that it is appropriate to spend on any single individual. This 
view is incorporated most explicitly in the practice, far from perfect as it 
is, of NICE but deserves a more general and explicit incorporation into 
public practices. 
Now it seems to me that if public bodies are right in limiting the 
resources to be spent on keeping me alive I should acknowledge that 
their decision is right, and in appropriate circumstances I should apply
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similar standards in deciding for myself how much others should sacrifice 
in order to keep me alive. It is important, in considering these matters, 
to remember that most people’s lives are enmeshed with the life of 
others, and that it is important that decisions of life and death should be, 
if possible, shared. But that does not diminish the importance 
of the other-regarding considerations I am discussing, and some of them, 
	  
by their nature, make a shared decision difficult. 
	  
I am saying this in full awareness of the fact that it is a view that 
does not find much support in public opinion at the moment. This 
recognition is double edged. On the one hand it points to the fact that 
the legalisation of euthanasia, if achieved, will be implemented in 
conditions where the public is not fully in agreement with its true moral 
justification, and that may be a severe problem in the way the legalised 
right is administered, and practised. It is the sort of factor that makes 
one inclined to wonder whether the time for legalisation has arrived? 
Maybe the underhand, inconsistent and informal practices in various 
hospitals are the best we can have right now? Yet on the other hand, it 
makes one wonder whether we do not need a decisive step, like a 
limited legalisation of euthanasia, with strong protections against abuse, 
at the present time in order to refocus the debate in ways that would 
lead to a more radical reorientation of our attitudes to death, and to a 
saner willingness to integrate our dying as an event in our lives. 
